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AbSTrACT
The goal of this article is to conceptualize the US strategies towards the Northern Triangle 
countries during 2005–2015. Using Destradi’s framework of regional power strategies, 
this paper analyses strategic documents and secondary sources regarding how US 
defined goals of its regional cooperation and means for their achievement. It concludes 
claiming that the US strategy towards the region can be called hegemonic as it was openly 
subordinated to its needs. Nevertheless, there has been a shift from hard to intermediate 
hegemony as the US became more perceptive to the needs of its regional partners. 
KEYWOrDS: Northern Triangle, regional powers, regional strategies, empire, hege-
mony.
rESUMEN
El artículo sistematiza las estrategias de los EE. UU. hacia los países del Triángulo Nor-
te, siguiendo la categorización de Destradi. Para ello, se ha analizado el contenido de 
los documentos estratégicos para identificar como los EE. UU. definen sus objetivos en 
cuanto a la cooperación regional y las medidas para conseguirlos. El texto concluye con 
la afirmación que la estrategia de los EE.UU. hacia la regi ón puede definirse como hege-
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mónica, sin embargo, progresivamente se ha cambiado de dura a intermedia, a medida 
que los EE.UU. se hicieron más perceptivos a las necesidades de sus socios regionales.
PALAbrAS CLAVE: Triángulo Norte, poderes regionales, estrategias regionales, 
imperio, hegemonía.
Introduction
central america (ca), an important region for the us during the cold War, 
seemed to be forgotten by politicians, academics and broader public since the 
90s until the recurrent migration crisis started at the us border. unaccompanied 
minors, mostly from honduras, Guatemala and el salvador that reached the us 
in 2014, sparked public debates and renewed interest in the us-ca relations.
Interestingly, even in the 21st century, studies of us policies in the region 
often focus on the cold War period (colby 2011; Grandin 2006, 2011; Joseph, 
Grandin 2010; leoGrande 1998; travis 2016). furthermore, the literature 
tackling us relations with ca is rare, and more often the analysis is done in the 
broader, latin american-wide level (e.g., livingstone 2009, long 2011, long 
and Pastor 2010, lowenthal et al. 2009). finally, various authors describe the 
relationship between the us and its neighbors using concepts coined before 
the end of the cold War, without rethinking changes in the us priorities and 
without a  clear definition of the concepts. This article addresses these gaps 
conceptualizing strategies of the us in ca during 2005–2015. The period 
has been chosen due to two documents signed by the us during this period: 
dominican republic-central america free trade agreement (dr-cafta), 
signed in 2005, and us strategy for engagement in ca (ca strategy), adopted 
at the very end of 2014. Both strategies “frame” a decade of the us involvement 
in the region.
The first chapter of the article presents the literature on the us policies in 
central/latin america in the 21st century showing a lack of clear conceptua-
lization of us strategies towards the region. The second discusses different 
theoretical concepts: empire, hegemony and leadership, and, using destradi’s 
(2010) framework, proposes how to operationalize each strategy. finally, this 
framework is applied to the analysis of the us strategy towards ca. This arti-
cle focuses on the northern triangle (nt) countries – honduras, Guatemala, 
and el salvador. all three are by far the biggest recipients of the us aid in the 
region. Moreover, many of documents dedicated to ca explicitly target the 
nt sub-region and distinguish these three countries from their neighbors. 
after the analysis of strategic us documents, development aid flows and 
secondary sources, the article concludes claiming that even though the period of 
analysis covers two different administrations, the main characteristic of the us-ca 
strategy – its open subordination to the us security objectives – did not change. 
Thus, I propose to conceptualize it as “hegemonic”. nevertheless, with B. obama’s 
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election, the hegemony changed from hard to intermediate as the discourse has 
softened, making more efforts to include the demands from the partners and 
designating more funds to enhance the reforms in the neighborhood. The article 
concludes with the claim that a clear framework focused on what actor does allows 
clarifying conceptually vague affirmations and adds to a better understanding of 
regional interactions also outside the Western hemisphere.
Empire and Its backyard?
since the 19th century, the us influence over ca is unquestionable. The us 
policies in the region before and during the cold War are widely analyzed 
(cox 1994; Mitchener, Weidenmier 2004; ricard 2006; stirton Weaver 1994), 
and the military, economic and ideological dominance of the us over its 
neighbors during the period is widely acknowledged. 
nevertheless, since the end of the cold War, the interest of the us poli-
cymakers and broader academic community in the region fell. two regional-
scope trends that acquired more scholarly attention were the negotiations 
and entry into force of dr-cafta and, more recently, the rise of insecurity 
and migration. The latter renewed the discussion about the role of the us 
in ca, especially in the nt countries. Journalists (lima 2018; Planas, Grim 
2014; tseng-Putterman 2018), academics critical of the us role in the region 
(akram 2018, chomsky 2018) and even ca presidents (otto Perez Molina 
2014), pointed to the us attempts to dominate the region as one of the root 
causes for the migration crisis. 
The concept of “empire” referring to the us role in the ca (and in the 
broader sense latin america) is often paired with the one of “backyard” 
(Grandin 2001, leoGrande 1998, livingstone 2009, reyna 2016), showing, 
in this manner, the us dominance over the region and its persistent efforts to 
maintain it. nevertheless, many authors do not attempt to define what these 
terms mean and how their meaning might have changed during different pe-
riods. for example, G. Grandin, in his book Empires Workshop: Latin America, 
the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism, traces the “us impe-
rial policies” in latin america. connecting the 19th century policies of the 
us private companies, cold War and the rise of the so-called “neo-cons” in 
the us, G. Grandin observes that “it was in ca where the republican Party 
first combined the three elements that give today’s imperialism its moral force: 
punitive idealism, free-market absolutism, and right-wing christian mobili-
zation” (Grandin 2006: 6). he uses the terms of empire and hegemony as sy-
nonyms, discussing everything from the us attempts to rearrange Mexican 
economy or, in general, the promotion of free trade, to military interventions 
and use of american soft power since 19th century to the War on terror. 
J. colby (2011) analyses the pre-cold War events in ca, establishing rela-
tions between us private business companies, its racial attitudes and the ex-
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panse of its influence in the region. he connects the business model of united 
fruits company with the so-called “american empire,” nevertheless, without 
going into details what empire is and how it works. 
G. M. Joseph, in the book Close encounters with Empire (1998), goes even 
further claiming that he has no interest in the “attenuated debate” about whether 
the united states constitutes an empire as, according to him “such arguments 
also ignore structures, practices, and discourses of domination and possession 
that run throughout u.s. history”(Gilbert 1998: 6). There is no effort to separate 
what empire is from what it is not. The essays in this volume discuss many facets 
of the us policies, from movie propaganda to the role of rockefeller foundation 
in ca, always emphasizing the one-sidedness, subordinated position and sense 
of us superiority. nevertheless, the clear-cut clarification if all these characte-
ristics are typical to an empire (or imperialist foreign policy) is missing. long 
observes this tendency in many works on the us empire in latin america, as 
they start with the proclamation of the us as an empire with little attention to 
the previous usage of the term or attempts to define it (long 2011: 15).
loose use of the term “empire” in the discussion about the us foreign po-
licy, especially during the years of G. W. Bush administration, is not limited 
to latin american studies. The War on terror led to the re-birth of academic 
discussion about the “american empire.” The number of adjectives attached 
to it multiplied: ferguson (2004) and Mallab (2002) call the us “a reluctant 
empire”; cox, an “empire by denial”; Gilderhus (2005), an “informal empire”. 
Prys and robe (2011) claim that the vision of the us as an empire in the 21st 
century is based on a particular historical period. according to them, the pro-
ponents of “empire” have largely misinterpreted the policy strategy of empire 
— as applied by the George W. Bush administration — for the real thing, an 
existing empire (Prys, robe 2011: 254). 
Their proposal to separate a strategy (what actor does) and the status/role 
(what actor is), becomes a departure point of this article. Instead of asking 
what the us is in ca/nt, this article focuses on how different us govern-
ments engaged with the region. While this approach does not allow easy ge-
neralizations (if one maintains hegemonic strategy – is it hegemon or empire 
in disguise?), it allows seeing variation and change of roles the powerful actors 
choose for themselves.
Strategies of regional Powers: Leadership, Hegemony 
and Empire
Given the preponderance of the us in comparison to the nt countries, and 
its attempts to shape the political and economic dynamic in the sub-region, it 
is analyzed as a regional power. Given that the majority of regional powers are 
middle powers, their studies do dwell on the idea of domination and pay more 
attention to the nuances of regional powerhood (see nolte 2006, 2010; Prys 
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2010; Mitchell 2016), regional hegemony and leadership (see Burges 2008, 
2015; flemes 2010; Pedersen 2002; Prys 2008), and strategies of stronger sta-
tes (destradi 2010). This article uses the framework of s. destradi (2010), as 
it is the most elaborated conceptual attempt to understand not what regional 
power is, but how it might act towards its corresponding region. according to 
destradi, five strategies of engagement: imperial, hegemonic (distinguishing 
three different types: hard, intermediate and soft), and leadership, can be dis-
tinguished based on the following characteristics:
1. Ends of a regional strategy. an attempt to realize regional actor’s self-interests 
tells apart all strategies from the leadership, which is marked by a genuine 
attempt to achieve objectives important for majority states of the region.  
2. Means used to achieve them. While the imperial strategy is distinguished by 
the reliance on the military intervention (or a threat of it), different hege-
monic strategies rely on a broader spectrum of instruments ranging from 
sanctions and political pressure to economic inducements and normative 
persuasion/socialization. 
3. Self-representation of regional power (e.g., in its documents, speeches of lea-
ding politicians) might vary from aggressive/threatening (typical to impe-
rial strategy) to a cooperative (in case of leadership). 
4. A discrepancy between the real actions and self-representation. a higher dis-
crepancy is more typical to hegemonic strategies, as the regional power 
“pretends” to be softer than it is. 
5. Legitimation. While in case of imperial and harder hegemonic strategies 
there would be no or low-level of legitimation, in case of a softer hegemony 
and leadership the role of regional power would be seen as legitimate by its 
neighbors.
6. Subordinated states strategies. In the case of “harder” strategies implemen-
ted by regional power, countries either intent to resist or obey out of the 
sheer calculation. In case of a softer hegemony or leadership, they either 
comply due to changed values or willingly follow its lead.
7. Change in subordinated states’ normative orientation. Paradoxically, in case 
of harder strategies, the change of normative orientations is rarer as states 
tend to resist. 
according to destradi, “when it comes to operationalizing these concepts 
for empirical research; however, a  reduction in the number of dimensions 
considered seems to be appropriate” (destradi 2011: 928). two characteristics 
that allow distinguishing different ideal types are a) a commonality or diver-
gence of goals pursued by the regional power and neighboring countries and, 
b) means employed by the regional power in its relations with these countries. 
These dimensions are complementary and both necessary: the ends distin-
guish soft hegemony from leadership; means – empire from hegemony. Mo-
reover, looking at means we can capture different types of hegemonic strategy. 
Therefore, this article focuses on these two elements of the us-ca strategy, 
sustaining that while the additional characteristics would help to understand 
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better the consequences and context of regional strategy, these two are suffi-
cient seeking to characterize it. table 1 summarizes the analytical matrix gui-
ding empirical research. 
empire hegemony leadership
hard Intermediate soft
ends self-interested self-interested self-interested self-interested Common 
Means Military, 
Intervention, 
threat of 
intervention
sanctions, 
threats, 
political 
pressure
Material 
beneﬁts/
inducements:
economic
side-payments,
military 
support
normative 
persuasion, 
socialization 
(for example, 
through joint 
working groups 
or committees  
on contentious 
issues)
normative 
persuasion, 
socialization 
process
source: own elaboration.
Us in the Northern Triangle
development in international relations after the Iraq war and the consequen-
ces of the Great recession affected the priorities of the us in the region. The 
first trend led to what some analysts called a “benign indifference” (loventhal 
et al. 2009: 43) towards the neighboring region. The second one put the pres-
sure on the us foreign aid capacities, forced to rethink the intervention logic 
and reconsider finances dedicated to it.
as for latin america, the primary challenge during the whole period 
was a so-called left turn taking place in the region. left-wing governments 
coming to power in nearly all countries in latin america tended to have 
a more critical view of the us role and started various regionalist projects 
without its participation. The breakup of the us promoted free trade area 
of the americas (ftaa) negotiations in 2005 was one of the signs of “rebe-
llion,” and the spread of Venezuelan influence was seen as potentially pro-
blematic by the us. The nt countries also felt these changes. The honduran 
president Manuel Zelaya, elected in 2006, with time forged closer relations 
with Venezuela, joining Petro caribe initiative and the Bolivarian alterna-
tive for the americas (alBa). The rule of M. Zelaya was disrupted by the 
coup in 2009, finishing 27 years of peaceful civilian rule. In the same year, 
after 20 years of right-wing party rule, a left-wing party, formed by former 
guerrillas won presidential elections in el salvador. It can be concluded that 
by the end of the first decade of the 21st century, politicians searching for 
more autonomy replaced the actively pro-american presidents. further-
Table 1. 
Potential strategies that could 
be employed by regional 
power. In bold: a key feature 
that allows to distinguish 
the strategy
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more, the security was becoming more relevant. The homicide rates were 
growing in all three countries until the second decade of the 21st century. 
especially violent changes took place in honduras between 2007 until 2011 
and in el salvador between 2013 and 2015, when murder rates grew two to 
three times (World Bank data) and finally insecurity became one of the rea-
sons for migration, which reached the peak in 2014.
to sum up, two trends were shaping the us-nt relations: a diminishing 
role of the us in the region and the growing importance of the nt to the us 
through the security challenges and migration flows. The two us administra-
tions approached these changes in somewhat similar, and yet, different way.
George W. bush Administration
A. Ends of the Regional Strategy
In 2001, George W. Bush claimed that the primary goal of his presidency was 
“to ignite a new era of economic growth through a world trading system that 
is dramatically more open and free.” (Bush 2001). Thus, the signature of dr-
cafta was reflecting one of the main objectives of his presidency. during 
the period 2005–2009 the second biggest thematic group of projects finan-
ced by the us in three nt countries was related to economic liberalization 
(table 2). The exception was Guatemala, where economy-oriented projects 
were somewhat marginal, partially due to the fact that Guatemala was tackling 
painful recovery process after the civil war and support for the Peace accords 
and stability was a more immediate priority. 
 2005–2009
Thematic group* el salvador honduras Guatemala
da 36.7 49.5 69.3
Governance 9.6 6.3 11.9
economy 26.6 37.1 7.8
security 27.2 7.1 11.0
total 100% 100% 100%
*da (development aid) – projects in “traditional” development assistance field, such as health-
care, agriculture, environment, education. Governance: decentralization, strengthening of 
political system and institutions, support to human rights and independent media. economy: 
economic liberalization, economic infrastructure, strengthening the private sector, support for 
dr-cafta. security: military support, training of the police, community security programs.
source: usaId.
similarly, the amount of aid disbursed for projects related to the econo-
mic transformation was growing – many of the funds were going directly to 
support the implementation of dr-cafta (Graph 1). 
Table 2.  
Thematic distribution of 
projects financed by the us in 
three north triangle countries 
(disbursements) in 2005-2009
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The political elites of ca were actively seeking the signature of dr-cafta 
due to the losses after the entrance into force of nafta (condo et al. 2005: 8). 
nevertheless, the opening of the negotiation was more related to the foreign 
policy goals (failure to secure the ftaa because of a spread of “socialism of 
the 21st century”) and general “freedom” agenda of Bush’s administration, than 
an active push from ca.
The us administration saw dr-cafta not only as merely commercial 
but rather as a transformative agreement, “adding up” to the democratization 
of the neighborhood. as the official position of us government stated: “The 
cafta-dr is a  regional trade agreement among all seven signatories, and 
will contribute to the transformation of a region that was consumed in inter-
nal strife and border disputes just a decade ago” (ustr 2004: 1). The trans-
formation should come through the “more open and transparent procedures, 
which should deepen the roots of democracy, civil society, and the rule of law 
in the region, as well as reinforce market reforms” (ustr 2004: 3). Thus, given 
the marginal importance of ca in the us export market, the signature of the 
treaty was instead a demonstration of the power and success of us “pushy” 
free trade agenda, which seemed stuck after the collapse of the ftaa nego-
tiations and the delays in the fta negotiations with australia and Morocco.
second, the way the dr-cafta was negotiated shows unequal power 
setting – the negotiations for the initial agreement were very brief, bearing 
in mind the number of countries involved and the disparities between the 
southern countries. similarly, in most of the cases, the us had the lead in the 
pace of the negotiations, being the first to propose its position or initial draft 
versions of the documents, often basing them on the fta with chile (Gon-
zalez 2006: i). The us has been reluctant to make concessions, given that the 
negotiations were seen as an example and blueprint to future fta negotiations 
(Gonzalez 2006: 85). hence, while the governments of ca countries suppor-
10 
 
 
Source: USAID 
 
Th political lites of CA were ac ively seeking the signature of DR-CAFTA due 
to the losses after the entrance into force of NAFTA (Condo et al. 2005: 8). 
Nevertheless, the opening of the negotiation was more related to the foreign policy 
goals (failure to secure the FTAA because of a spread of “socialism of the 21st century”) 
and general “freedom” agenda of Bush’s administration, than an active push from CA. 
The US administrati  saw DR-CAFTA not only a  merely commercial but rather 
as a transformative agreement, “adding up” to the democratization of the neighborhood. 
As the official position of US government stated: “The CAFTA-DR is a regional trade 
agreement among ll seven signatories, and will contribute to the transformation of a 
region that was consumed in internal strife and border disputes just a decade ago” 
(USTR 2004: 1). The transfor ation should come through the “more open and 
transparent procedures, which should deepen the roots of democracy, civil society, and 
the rule of law in the region, as well as reinforce market reforms” (USTR 2004: 3). 
Thus, given the marginal i po tance of CA in the US export mark t, the signature of 
the treaty was instead a demonstration of the power and success of US “pushy” free 
trade agenda, which seemed stuck after the collapse of the FTAA negotiations and the 
delays in the FTA negotiations wit  Australia a d Morocco. 
Second, the way the DR-CAFTA was negotiated shows unequal power setting - 
the negotiations for the initial agreement were very brief, bearing in mind the number of 
countries involved and the disparities between the Southern Countries. Similarly, in 
most of the cases, the US had the lead in the pace of the negotiations, being the first to 
propose its position or initial draft versions of the documents, often basing them on the 
FTA with Chile (Gonzalez 2006: i). The US has been reluctant to make concessions, 
0 
20000000 
40000000 
60000000 
80000000 
100000000 
120000000 
140000000 
160000000 
180000000 
200000000 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
DA 
Governance 
Economic transformation 
Security  
10 
 
 
Source: USAID 
 
The political elites of CA w re actively s eking the sign t r  f DR-CAFTA due 
to the losses after the entrance into force of NAFTA (Condo et al. 2005: 8). 
Nevertheless, the openi g of the negotiation was more related to the for ign policy 
goals (failure to secure the FTAA b cause of a spread of “soci lism of the 21st century”) 
and general “freedom” agenda of Bush’s administration, than an active push from CA. 
The US administration saw DR-CAFTA not only as merely commercial but rather 
as a transformative agreement, “adding up” to the democratization of he neighborhood. 
As the official position of US government stated: “The CAFTA-DR is a regional trade 
agree ent among all s ven signatories, and will contribute to the transformation of a 
region that was consumed in internal strife and border disputes just a d cade ago” 
(USTR 2004: 1). The transformation should come through the “more open and 
transparent procedures, which should deepen the roots of democracy, civil society, and 
the rule of law in the regi , as well as reinforce m rket reforms” (USTR 2004: 3). 
Thus, given the marginal importance of CA in the US export market, the signature of 
the treaty was instead a demonstration of the power and success of US “pushy” free 
trade agenda, which seemed stuck after the collapse of the FTAA negotiations a d the 
delays in the FTA negotiations with Australia and Morocco. 
Second, the way the DR-CAFTA was negotiated shows unequal power setting - 
the negotiations f r the initial agr ement were very brief, bearing in mind th number of 
countries involved and the dispariti s between the Southern Countries. Simil rly, in 
most of the cases, the US had the lead in the pace of the negotiations, being the first to 
propose its position or initial draft versions of the documents, often basing them on the 
FTA with Chile (Gonzalez 2006: i). The US has been reluctant to make concessions, 
0 
20000000 
40000000 
60000000 
80000000 
100000000 
12 000000 
140000000 
160000000 
180000000 
200000000 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
DA 
Governance 
Economic transformation 
Security  
source: usaId.
Graph 1. 
us financed projects 
(disbursements) 2005–2009 
according to their 
thematic sphere
183
Empire, Leadership or 
Hegemony: US Strategies  
towards the Northern Triangle 
Countries in the 21st Century
Ieva Giedraityte
ted the agreement, the negotiations and the final agreement strongly reflected 
the needs (rather political than economic) of the us and its broader foreign 
policy agenda. 
The expected regional transformation did not happen, and the security si-
tuation worsened. as a response, a so-called Merida initiative was designed to 
tackle transnational crime in Mexico and ca (mostly nt). Its funds were used 
to bolster the capacity of government to inspect and interdict drugs and to 
support the us strategy for combating criminal Gangs from ca and Mexico, 
(cook, rush, ribando seelke 2008: 2). nevertheless, different security strate-
gies did not mean a steep jump in security-related projects – as can be seen in 
graph 2, their value between 2007 and 2008 grew less than by 8%. 
concluding, the major preoccupation of the us in the nt was related with 
the broader foreign policy goals (dr-cafta as a continuation of ambitious la-
tin american scale policies) and security issues, mostly related with the spillover 
of insecurity from Mexico and colombia. While fighting this phenomenon was 
in the interests of the nt countries, the us policies primarily centered on its 
needs. for example, while the nt countries were claiming that the deporta-
tions of their citizens are aggravating gang situation, the us migration services 
were not indicating which of the deportees were belonging to the gangs, unless 
this was the primary reason of deportation (ribando seelke 2016). similarly, 
the push from latin america to tackle drug consumption instead of fighting 
the production or tackling the lax gun laws production passed unheard. Thus, 
regarding its goals, the us strategy towards ca can be considered as imperial 
or hegemonic. however, the analysis of means used to achieve these goals is 
needed to define which category of these two is more suitable. 
B. Means to Achieve Them
since the attack on Panama in 1989, the us has never used open military force 
in the region and, thus, according to the framework of destradi, the us strate-
gy was hegemonic, not imperialist. nevertheless, its governments have never 
ceased picturing the us as a natural leader of the region, claiming that “while 
we do not seek to dictate to other states the choices they make, we do seek 
to influence the calculations on which these choices are based. We also must 
hedge appropriately in the case states choose unwisely” (nss 2006: 41). one 
of the principal instruments was foreign financial assistance which in internal 
documents on the us foreign aid was called “one of the tools the united states 
employs to advance us interests in latin america and the caribbean, and the 
focus and funding levels of aid programs change along with broader us policy 
goals” (Meyers 2018: 1).
The importance of ftaa and later of dr-cafta agreement led to sig-
nificant us pressure for countries to sign the deal. In costa rica, which was 
the last one to sign dr-cafta agreement and only after the close win of the 
agreement’s supporters in the referendum, before the voting the us ambassa-
dor M. langdale often repeated the threat that country would lose the existing 
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preferential treatment in case of negative voting. These threats were angrily 
picked up by agreement’s opponents in the us congress, stating that the us 
is not going to retaliate to the countries deciding against the free trade agree-
ments (congressional records 2007: h11132). 
for those willing to sign the agreement the possibility of us blocking it, 
was a strong motivator to support military intervention in Iraq. all three nt 
countries not only supported the war (despite generalized opposition in latin 
america led by Mexico, chile, and Brazil) but also sent a  small number of 
soldiers to support the mission. The dr-cafta treaty has been signed, and 
countries received military aid. Moreover, in aid programming documents 
elaborated under the administration of G. W. Bush, this choice was always 
mentioned as a demonstration of the will to cooperate.
furthermore, during this period, smaller countries were aware of the 
possibility of sanctions in case of not supporting us foreign policy goals. for 
example, they were quick to sign the so-called article 98 agreements, stipu-
lating that signatory countries were agreeing not to hand over us citizen to 
the International criminal court. The massive us-led campaign against the 
court’s Jurisdiction was accompanied with the pressure and threats to cut off 
the military and economic aid given to the countries. all nt countries signed 
article 98 agreements, el salvador being the first country in latin america 
to do that. The price of not signing was real – costa rica, which, together 
with other 11 countries, refused to sign it, was temporarily refused military 
and economic aid. By 2009, most of the article 98 limitations were lifted, due 
to concerns of G. W. Bush administration that it could lead to diminishing of 
us role in these countries (ribando seelke 2006). to sum up, the instruments 
used by the us: political pressure, sanctions or economic rewards, indicate 
that we cannot call the us strategy imperial, as, according to the framework 
of destradi, the latter is defined by military intervention. however, the selfish 
goals, together with economic and political pressure and rewards, indicate the 
use of hard hegemonic strategy towards the nt countries during the period 
of analysis.
barack Obama Administration
A. Ends of the Regional Strategy
Implemented projects and strategic documents show that at the beginning of 
Barack obama presidency, there was more continuity than change. for exam-
ple, the priorities of the us in ca countries, enumerated in congressional 
Budget Justification for foreign operations acts (democratization, economic 
growth, and security) did not change substantially between two administra-
tions. Moreover, supporting economic liberalization or rather “ensuring an 
economic growth” still was among the main priorities. In 2010, obama laun-
ched a new presidential initiative, a Partnership for Growth, to accelerate and 
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sustain broad-based economic growth. el salvador became one of the first 
countries to take part in it. as well, fostering economic growth became one 
of the priorities in Guatemala’s and honduras country development strategies 
– key documents for the usaId involvement in the countries. nevertheless, 
as can be seen in graph 3, since 2010, the number of directly economy-related 
projects and interventions fell sharply.
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The concerns related to economic growth were pushed aside by growing 
security issues. The increasing homicide rates in ca, drug trafficking and 
growing drug-related violence led to the shift in the us involvement. In 2010, 
from the ca branch of Merida initiative, the ca regional security Initiative 
(carsI) was created. officially it “was supposed to take a broad approach to 
the issue of security that goes well beyond the traditional focus on preventing 
narcotics from reaching the united states” (Meyer, ribando seelke 2013: 2). 
Growing migratory pressures and insecurity “brought back” the nt coun-
tries to national security strategy in 2015. similarly, the ca strategy and us-
aId regional strategy for ca and Mexico, adopted respectively at the end of 
2014 and in 2015, reflect the fear related to the instability in the sub-region. 
ca strategy mentions different trends taking place in the region (i.e., econo-
mic “deficiencies,” high energy costs, growing population, climate change) as 
a  source of threats. according to the document, “implications are stark for 
the united states if the aforementioned concerns become a trend. More than 
five million central americans are expected to join the workforce over the 
next decade, many of them in Guatemala and honduras. If economic pros-
pects remain poor, and the crime rate remains high, migration and organized 
crime may present challenges for the united states and Mexico” (ca strategy 
Graph 3.  
us financed projects 
(disbursements) 2010–2016 
according to their  
thematic sphere
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2014). Thus, the growing number of governance and development aid pro-
jects, which can be seen in table 3, also can be explained by the fact that more 
facets of ca reality were seen as dangerous. 
2014–2016
el salvador honduras Guatemala
da 39.4 49.6 63.1
Governance 27.5 29.2 14.4
economy 19.7 2.7 2.7
security 13.4 18.6 19.8
total 100% 100% 100%
2010–2013
el salvador honduras Guatemala
da 75.2 49.2 60.6
Governance 7.1 10.2 14.7
economy 9.7 27.7 3.8
security 8.0 12.9 20.9
total 100% 100% 100%
source: usaId.
While opening himself to an alternative approach towards drug-related 
problems, B. obama was strict about deportation policy, and the number of 
deported illegal migrants steadily grew since his election despite ca countries 
protests. The so-called removals reached their peak in 2014 when, compared 
to 2005, 3.6 times more people were removed from the us (us customs and 
Border Protection). additionally, as a foreign assistance program, carsI was 
unable to address two of the principal factors contributing to insecurity the us 
migration policy (including the large-scale deportation of criminal youth) and 
the widespread availability of trafficked firearms (olson et al. 2015: 10). conclu-
ding, the strong primacy of the us foreign policy goals indicates the continua-
tion of hegemonic strategy towards the region. however, we need to study the 
means used by the us in order to define the type of hegemonic strategy. 
B. Means to Achieve Them
While the discourse of partnership has never disappeared from official docu-
ments, B. obama distinguished himself as being more “inclusive.” The pro-
posed approach to ca problems foresaw three groups of actions: convening 
different partners to establish a common understanding of the problem, de-
veloping a shared vision with ca countries and establishing a mechanism to 
coordinate international support for a  region. hence, at least theoretically, 
more emphasis was given and space foreseen for socialization processes both 
between the us and ca countries and between the us, ca and other donors. 
Table 3. 
Thematic distribution 
of projects financed 
by the us in three 
north triangle countries 
(disbursements) 
during 2010-2017
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In the meeting with obama, that took place on July 2014, three presidents 
of the nt countries criticized us response to the migration crisis, as too fo-
cused on border security and pleaded to attend the “root causes” of migra-
tion: drug violence and lack of economic opportunities. Their demands were 
at least partially heard as at the end of the same year, under the guidance of 
the Inter-american development Bank (IaBd), they elaborated the so-called 
“Plan alliance for Prosperity” (PaP), establishing main lines for their coun-
tries. despite being criticized for its speedy preparation and exclusion of ci-
vil society from the process (Pineda and Matarmoso 2017: 38–39), PaP was 
aligned with nt priorities and national development plans. It also became 
a source for alignment for the ca strategy, showing that the us government 
was at least officially hearing the proposals formulated by the governments of 
the region.
Moreover, the funds designated to ca grew since 2009. as it can be seen in 
the graph 4, despite the fall in the disbursements for the projects implemented 
by us agencies in the nt countries between 2010 and 2013, the amount of 
financial aid was growing steadily under the obama government, with a steep 
jump in 2015. 
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seeking congressional approval for growing expenditures, the ca strategy 
was presented as a  conditional agreement rather than a  development plan. 
a commitment of the nt (and more broadly speaking, ca) countries to the 
reforms were mentioned in various discourses presenting ca strategy (e.g., 
Biden 2015). for its part, congress has placed strict conditions on the aid. 
a  75% was conditional to the implementation of specific policies, ranging 
from the management of migration flows (including the cooperation with 
the us agencies in the repatriation of illegal migrants proceeding from these 
countries) and improving border security to the transparency of governance 
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and persecution of human right abusers (consolidated appropriations act 
2016: 554–555). The state department was responsible for checking the ful-
fillment of a long list of conditions, which delayed the disbursements (Meyer 
2019: 11). 
to sum up, the main change in the us strategy during the obama ad-
ministration was related to the means rather than its ends. While latter were 
still subordinated to us foreign policy goals, material payments and military 
support took the place of open political pressure and a  threat of sanctions. 
hence, the strategy implemented by obama was corresponding to interme-
diate hegemonic strategy. What is more, the emphasis on cooperation and jo-
int problem solving is also typical to soft hegemonic strategy and, thus, there 
was a shift towards it at the end of the period. 
Conclusions
This article applies destradi’s framework of regional power strategies in or-
der to conceptualize the us strategies towards the nt countries during two 
consecutive us administrations: G. W. Bush and B. obama. from seven di-
mensions proposed by destradi, only two (ends and means used) are analy-
zed, as only they are necessary, complementary and sufficient features to un-
derstand the type of regional strategy employed. looking at the results of the 
comparison, we can observe both continuity and change. The primary goal of 
G.W. Bush administration was related to the economic opening of the region, 
while B. obama had a more ambitious and holistic vision of neighborhood 
transformation. Moreover, the unilateralist push in the post-Iraq war context 
gave place to a broader regional level coalition building, seeking to address the 
unaccompanied minor migrant crisis of 2014.
nevertheless, in both cases, the primary motivation of the us was its pres-
sing needs and its security. The nss of 2006 states that “If america’s nearest 
neighbors are not secure and stable, then americans will be less secure.” a si-
milar rationale can be observed in the ca strategy, claiming that “u.s. secu-
rity is intimately linked to the security and prosperity of ca” (ca strategy 
2014). Thus, both administrations were implementing hegemonic strategies 
yet, during the period of analysis, there was a shift from hard to intermediate 
hegemony. table four summarizes these findings. 
These variations can be hidden under broad and loosely defined concepts 
such as an “empire” or “colossus,” in this manner hiding the peculiarities of the 
us power and limiting the analytical usefulness of the concepts themselves. 
future research could focus on the policies of donald trump administration, 
seeking to compare how two similar migration crisis, 2014 and 2017, changed 
the us strategy under two different administrations. Besides, the expansion of 
the framework to other dimensions, such as legitimation, subordinate states 
strategies and changes in their internal norms, would also be necessary, as 
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source: own elaboration. 
hegemonic strategy
Hard
2005-2009
G.W. Bush administration
Intermediate
2010-2015
B. obama administration
ends Self-interested 
us strategy in central america is 
clearly subordinated to the foreign 
policy goals: free trade agenda and 
support of the Iraq war.
Self-interested 
us strategy in central america is 
subordinated to the us security 
agenda: first, drug trafficking and 
gangs; later, migration management.
Means sanctions, threats, political pressure:
•	 political	pressure	and	threats	of	
financial sanctions in cafta 
negotiations;
•	 financial	sanctions	for	those,	not	
signing article 98 agreements; 
•	 pressures	for	the	support	of	Iraq	
war.
Material beneﬁts/ inducements 
(economic side-payments, military 
support):
•	 rise	in	financial	support,	
nevertheless with the strong 
conditionality causing delays;
•	 military	support:	reframing	
Merida’s central american branch 
into carsI;
 shift towards soft hegemonic 
strategy (?): normative persuasion 
and socialization through joint 
initiatives and working groups.
it could also allow to discuss the effectiveness of different strategies. a clear 
framework focused on what actor does instead of on what actor is, allows not 
only to understand better the us policies, but also to compare them in time 
(between the administrations) and, even more importantly, with the ones of 
other regional powers. such comparisons would help to overcome the ideas 
about the us exceptionalism and, consequently, understand better the rela-
tionship dynamics between different powerful actors and their neighbors.
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